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Abstract — Electricity systems require flexibility to maintain 
their operations. This can be provided by demand response 
(DR). Therefore, markets are evolving to be more open to DR. 
However, there still exist barriers for DR participation. These 
can be categorised into product, economic, technical and 
consumer barriers. On the other hand, there is a trend towards 
harmonising national electricity markets so that international 
exchange could be possible. As these two trends can counteract 
each other, problems may arise. The interaction of these two 
trends is discussed while looking at two forms of reserves across 
four countries: Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France. 
In this way, different product characteristics can be found. 
Hence, it is recommended that harmonisation should focus on 
DR first, with an emphasis on aggregation possibility, before 
trying to converge other characteristics and potentially 
strengthen other barriers. 
Index Terms — demand response, harmonisation, product 
barriers, reserve market 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electricity systems have always needed flexibility to 
maintain their balance. With the rising amount of renewable, 
variable energy, this requirement becomes even more 
important. Flexibility can be provided by several sources such 
as flexible power plants or electricity storage. Another way of 
providing this is demand response (DR). With DR, consumers 
will react to peak demand by curtailing their loaf or by shifting 
it to periods with lower demand. In this way, no extra 
generation is required in the peak periods to balance the 
system [1]. 
DR can be categorised into two types. First, price-based 
DR will introduce dynamic pricing in order to let consumers 
decide when and how they will curtail or shift their demand. 
Second, incentive-based DR will provide financial incentives 
for demand shedding independent from the electricity price at 
that time. This can be done e.g. by a third party without 
actions from the consumers (direct load control) or by giving 
the consumers the responsibility of shedding (curtailable load) 
[1]. 
With the current transition towards sustainable energy 
supply, DR is seen as a step of the solution. Therefore, the EU 
has already incorporated DR in some of their directives, i.e. 
the Electricity Directive (2009/71/EC) and the Energy 
Efficiency Directive (2012/27/EU). This last Directive 
specifically addresses that barriers for DR participation have 
to be removed and that DR has to be encouraged [2]. At the 
same time, there is a transition towards a harmonised 
electricity market. Creating a larger market will not only allow 
suppliers of reserves to choose from more buyers, but will also 
improve adequacy as more reserves are available in time of 
emergency [3]. However, these two trends should not 
contradict each other by steering the market in opposite 
directions. This paper will look at what the current status of 
this problem is, specifically for reserve markets. 
Section II discusses the different kind of barriers for 
demand response. Section III gives an explanation and some 
examples of the harmonisation of electricity markets. Section 
IV explains the reserve market for Belgium, The Netherlands, 
Germany and France. Section V discusses the barriers of these 
countries for two kinds of reserves. Section VI will conclude 
this paper. 
II. BARRIERS FOR DEMAND RESPONSE 
Most of the barriers for participation in DR products can 
be organised into four categories: product, economic, technical 
and consumer related barriers [4]. As the focus in this paper 
lies on the product barriers, these will be discussed more 
thoroughly while the economic, technological and consumer 
barriers are briefly explained. 
A. Product barriers 
Originating from the design of the regulatory framework, 
the market and the product itself, product barriers exist 
because market structures are still focused on the 
characteristics of the generators that used to be the only 
players in the market. With the rise of aggregators, these old 
market structures can act as a barrier as they protect the 
incumbent suppliers and may not be suitable for participation 
of aggregators [4]–[6]. In this way, this could be seen as a 
barrier imposed by the TSO. There are three important product 
barriers: minimum size, timing requirements and symmetry. 
The first product barrier is the requirement of a minimum 
bid size [5]–[9]. Traditional suppliers have large, centralized 
generation units which easily have an output in the range of 
hundreds of MW. However, for distributed suppliers and DR 
products in general, this is out of range: the lower the 
threshold, the better for them. A solution for this is to 
aggregate several installations to make it easier to meet the 
threshold [6].  
The second product barrier is related to the time 
requirements [4]–[7]. These include duration of the product, 
minimum run times and minimum down times. For DR 
products, generally speaking, it is better to have short run 
times and enough time between activations in order to not 
totally disrupt the consumers’ activities but this depends on 
the installation.  
The last product barrier is the symmetry of the bids [5], 
[6], [10]. For DR products, it is more difficult to provide 
downwards (load increasing) than upwards (load shedding) 
capacity than for traditional generators [6]. When perfect 
symmetry of bids is required, DR products will have to 
aggregate with other products to comply with this 
requirement.  
B. Economic barriers 
Economic barriers exist when there are financial 
(dis)incentives which hamper the usage of DR products [4]. 
These are mainly present when the financial incentives are too 
low or not existing at all. A prime example is that price 
differences between periods are not high enough to make 
households or businesses react to it [4]. Furthermore, 
consumers may choose not to participate in DR programs as 
they may increase their bills due to high peak demand usage. 
Another example is that penalties may be set too high for DR 
programmes to take the risk of non-compliance and having to 
pay the penalty [7]. 
C. Technical barriers 
These barriers are related to special requirements for the 
system or consumers in order to support DR [4]. An important 
barrier is that the required technology is not present at the 
consumer site: e.g. it is not possible to have time-varying 
prices if there is no meter present with those functionalities 
[6], [8], [11], [12]. Furthermore, these barriers are also present 
in the system itself: network and scheduling constraints can 
exist when demand is shifted if the grid is not suitable to 
handle these flows [13]–[16].  
D. Consumer barriers 
The last set of barriers are related to consumers and the 
corresponding retail market. An example of a more “soft” 
barrier related to consumer behaviour is that consumers may 
not be aware that they can participate in DR programmes or 
that they may not trust the system, which can lead to a 
inelastic demand [8]. This inelastic demand on its own can 
also be a barrier as consumers may not be willing to react to 
dynamic pricing or financial incentives. 
But the retail markets themselves also suffer from barriers. 
An example are policy restrictions that hamper the usage of 
DR in the retail market, which is mostly the result of not 
having the freedom to design rates. A related barrier is that the 
prices in wholesale markets are more variable than in the retail 
market with (mainly) fixed prices. As long as consumers are 
not or cannot be rewarded, DR will have difficulties breaking 
through. However, it is important to note that the opposite is 
also true: as long as DR is not present for end-consumers, the 
required technology will not be necessary and thus 
investments will stall [4].  
III. HARMONISATION OF ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
A move towards DR is not the only trend in electricity 
systems. Starting in 2009, the European Commission launched 
harmonising rules in order to create a European wide 
electricity market (i.e. market coupling) [3]. These are part of 
the Third Energy Package where the EU imposes legislation to 
improve the efficiency of the energy market [17]. Following 
these introductions, the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) was established, 
with the task to implement several objectives for 
harmonisation [18], [19].  
The focus of this market coupling was mainly on 
electricity trading markets [20]. But even a fully harmonised 
electricity trading market is not enough to ensure an efficient 
system as ancillary services will also be required [3]. A fully 
harmonised EU balancing market is not yet active due to the 
lack of regulation and cooperation between national system 
operators, although this is on the agenda of the regulators [21], 
[22]. Currently, only regional projects are present such as the 
Nordic balancing market in Sweden, Finland and Norway 
which will be launched in 2016 [3], [23].  
There are several reasons why a harmonised balancing 
market is important. First, TSOs will benefit from a more 
harmonised and thus larger market as this increases the 
number of suppliers of reserves. This will reduce market 
power from the incumbent suppliers and increase competition 
[20], [21]. This is an important reason as there currently exists 
a high market concentration for balancing markets. Second, a 
larger harmonised market will improve operational security as 
risks are spread over a larger number of balancing possibilities 
[21].  
IV. RESERVE MARKETS 
In this section, the reserve markets of four neighbouring 
countries in continental Europe will be described. The focus is 
on the Frequency Containment Reserves (FCR) and automatic 
Frequency Restoration Reserves (aFRR). The manual FRR  
and Restoration Reserves are outside the scope of this paper as 
the differences between the considered countries for these 
reserves are rather large [18]. Other reasons for this scope are 
that the FCR products are considered better to harmonise than 
other reserves and that the activated aFRR represents a large 
part of the reserves without FCR in these countries [24]. 
However, it can be interesting to consider these products in a 
further study to investigate why these differences are present. 
The information about the characteristics described here can 
be found on the websites of the respective TSOs. 
A. FCR 
The FCR products are the first reserve type to counter 
frequency deviations. These products should be able to 
stabilise the frequency drop or increase almost immediately so 
that aFRR products can be activated to restore the frequency 
[25].  
As these products are important to counter the first 
deviations, the specifications are described and coordinated by 
ENTSO-E. The result is that the characteristics of these 
products differ minimally between different countries (of the 
same synchronous area). A few characteristics are already 
aligned: aggregation is allowed, the activation time is a few 
seconds, the maximum time for 50% and the full activation 
time (FAT) is 15 s to 30 s, respectively, and the minimum size 
is 1 MW with increments of 1 MW, except for Belgium where 
this is only 0.1 MW. 
1) Belgium 
Currently, Belgium is required to contract 73 MW of FRR 
(“Primaire reserve”) in 2016. This is split up into four 
products: two symmetrical products and two asymmetrical 
ones, both for upwards and downwards changes. DR products 
are only allowed to participate in the asymmetric upwards 
product today, due to the nature of DR. 
These products are auctioned on monthly basis on an 
organised market, with the pay-as-bid price as their price. This 
price covers both the activation and stand-by costs. 
2) The Netherlands and Germany 
For the Netherlands the amount of required FCR 
(“Primaire regeling”) was 101 MW in 2016. There is only one 
product present, which is symmetrical, and load is not allowed 
to participate on the internal market. Important to note is that 
since January 2014, a part of the contracted FCR is procured 
on the German-Swiss system as a first step to harmonisation. 
In order to simplify this cooperation, the Dutch TSO decided 
to take the same characteristics for the products and tenders, 
which is why these two countries are considered together here. 
Germany on its own procures 583 MW “Primärregelleistung” 
on the common auction.  
Like the case for Belgium, there is an organised market for 
the bids, with pay-as-bid as the payment. The difference is that 
auctions take place weekly. 
3) France 
France needs a FCR (“Réglage primaire de fréquence”) of 
572 MW [26]. This is also symmetrical but the market is not 
completely open. Instead, each generator is required to 
provide capacity at a regulated price of €18 per MW per hour. 
Recently, the market opened up via bilateral agreements for 
DR participation (in 2014) and for traders (in 2015).  
B. aFRR 
There are two forms of FRR products which differentiate 
on the mode of activation: automatic (aFRR) or manual 
(mFRR). The aFRR products are activated first. If the 
frequency deviations are still not restored, the TSO will send 
out activation requests to the contracted suppliers who will 
manually activate their mFRR. In this way, the aFRR is freed 
so that it can be used for future imbalance situations [25].  
Compared to the FCR products, TSOs are more free to 
determine the characteristics of the FRR products. Therefore, 
the products will be more differentiated and less harmonised. 
1) Belgium 
The aFRR for Belgium (“Secundaire reserves”) are split 
between upwards and downwards products. The same amount 
is contracted for both products so that there exists one 
symmetrical aggregated product. This means that it should be 
easier for DR products to participate in this market but they 
are not allowed to due to current legislation. 
As for FCR, the minimum size is 1 MW, with increments 
of 0.1 MW and the bids are auctioned on a monthly basis with 
a pay-as-bid price. For the activation, bids are ranked from 
lowest price to highest price and are selected in ascending 
order until the required amount is reached. Then, the bids are 
activated pro rata so that every contracted supplier contributes 
the same share. The reaction time is maximum 30 s with a 
FAT of 7.5 min as the ramp rate has to be 13.3% per min. 
2) The Netherlands 
“Regelvermogen” is the Dutch aFRR and this exists in 
both upwards and downwards products. Load products are 
allowed but aggregation is not which may make it difficult for 
DR to participate in reality. On the other hand, symmetry is 
not necessary. 
The minimum size is 4 MW with increments of 1 MW. 
These products are auctioned on a yearly basis but instead of a 
merit-order approach, the Dutch TSO tries to get the lowest 
average price for the aFRR reserves in total. Because prices 
are linked to certain volumes, selecting only the cheapest bids 
may not result in the lowest total price. The activation of the 
bids happens according to a merit-order. With a ramp rate of 
7% per min, there is a FAT of 15 min which is among the 
largest in Europe. The reaction time is maximum 30 s. 
3) Germany 
The “Sekundärregelleistung” also has both upwards and 
downwards products as symmetry is not required. 
Furthermore, both DR and aggregation are allowed to 
participate. 
The minimum size is 5 MW with increments of 1 MW. 
The auctions happen on a weekly basis with pay-as-bid as the 
price. In contrast with the other countries, this price is for both 
the capacity (provision) and the energy (activation). The 
selection is based on the balancing capacity with the merit-
order principle, which is also used to determine which bid to 
activate. The reaction time is also 30 s with a FAT of 5 min 
but in contrast with the other countries, there is no fixed ramp 
rate. 
4) France 
“Réglage secondaire de fréquence” is open for DR 
products but has a requirement for symmetry, contrary to the 
aFRR products of the other countries. However, aggregation is 
allowed so upwards load products can be aggregated with 
downwards generation to provide symmetric products. 
The minimum bid size is 1 MW. Generators are obliged to 
provide a certain amount of aFRR at a price of €18 per MW 
per hour. The selection is made on a pro-rata basis. The 
reaction time is a few minutes with a FAT from 6 to 9 min. 
V. COUNTRY COMPARISON & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FCR 
In Table I, the different characteristics for FCR in the 
discussed countries are presented. The table is divided in three 
columns according to three categories of barriers: DR, 
harmonisation of reserves or shared between them. Where 
characteristics are already partly harmonised and positive for 
the implementation of DR, these are coloured grey. 
There is not much difference for the specific DR barriers: 
only the Netherlands do not allow load products to participate. 
For the shared barriers, there are two main differences. 
The first one is the requirement for symmetrical bids. DR, as 
well as some generators, has difficulties to provide symmetric 
products due to the nature of the product. Of the discussed 
countries, only Belgium currently allows asymmetric products 
to participate. However, they all allow aggregation which 
alleviates the symmetry requirements. The second one is the 
frequency of the tenders. This ranges from daily to monthly. 
The longer the timeframe of the tenders, the more difficult it is 
for consumers or aggregators to take part as it requires 
detailed information to plan DR over a long time [5].  
The barriers for the harmonisation of reserves focusses on 
the structure of the auctions. Except for France, the other 
countries have an organised market where FCR is exchanged, 
with a pay-as-bid price. However, in France, generators are 
obliged to participate and receive a regulated, fixed price for 
this. Although DR is allowed to participate as FCR, this is 
only via bilateral contracts and not via a market. 
In total, differences for FCR products seem low, except for 
tendering, because of the focus on harmonisation for his 
product by the Network Codes of ENTSO-E [27]. However, 
further harmonisation should still take into account the 
differences  in order to have a level playing field for DR to 
participate (e.g. by changing to a daily frequency of tenders).
Table I FCR Characteristics 
 Demand barriers Shared barriers between demand and harmonisation Harmonisation barriers 
Country Load access Aggregation 
Symmetry 
required 
Reaction 
time (s) 
FAT 
(s) 
Min. bid 
size (MW) 
Increment 
(MW) 
Tender 
frequency 
Capacity 
procurement 
Capacity 
payment 
BE Y Y N 15 30 1 0.1 Monthly Organised market Pay-as-bid 
NL N Y Y 15 30 1 1 Weekly Organised market Pay-as-bid 
DE Y Y Y 15 30 1 1 Weekly Organised market Pay-as-bid 
FR Y Y Y 15 30 1 / Daily Mandatory provision Regulated price 
B. aFRR 
In Table II, the different characteristics for aFRR are 
presented. As for the table for FCR, the table is split into 
demand barriers, shared barriers and harmonisation barriers. 
Looking at the table, we see that differences are more frequent 
than for FCR. This is not completely a surprise as ENTSO-E 
allows more freedom for the countries to decide on the 
required characteristics. This is because continental Europe is 
divided into several Load-Frequency Control Blocks which 
often are countries (e.g. Belgium is one Block) and which all 
have a controller to determine whether aFRR has to be 
activated or not [28]. Therefore, national interests can 
influence the decisions on how to set the characteristics. 
This difference is also clear when the DR barriers are 
compared. Germany and France are both open for DR and 
aggregation, while the Netherlands does not allow aggregation 
and Belgium does not allow DR at all. This can be a result of 
the obligation in Belgium that all reserves for the TSO (except 
R1) need a meter behind the meter to ensure correct 
measurement [5].  
Looking at the shared barriers, there are again more 
differences present than for FCR and these are spread over all 
the countries. The most obvious differences are symmetry 
requirements, FAT, ramp rates and minimum bid size. This 
can cause a serious problem when these countries form a 
market for aFRR together as not all reserves will be able to  
participate in all countries. The frequency of the tenders also is  
 
a barrier for harmonisation, as most countries have a different 
timeframe. 
For the harmonisation barriers, the pricing rules are 
roughly the same for each country except for France as it has a 
regulated price. However, the procurement and activation 
rules are quite different. In Belgium and the Netherlands, 
capacity is procured according to a co-optimisation with FCR 
(Belgium) or optimising to the lowest average total price (the 
Netherlands). In Germany however, the bids include both a 
capacity and energy price so that they are procured together. 
Another difference are the activation rules of the reserves. 
While in Belgium and France this is done pro-rata, as is the 
case for almost all of Europe [28], Germany and the 
Netherlands use a merit order approach. The problem here is 
that should there be a cross-border exchange of these reserves, 
it is not as efficient as it would be when all countries would 
have a merit order approach [29].   
It is clear that differences for aFRR products are larger 
than for FCR: there is not one characteristic that is harmonised 
over the four discussed countries. This poses a challenge when 
further harmonisation is discussed. If the focus is solely on 
harmonisation, the possibility exists that this increases barriers 
for DR. For example, if all countries converge to the French 
approach, aggregation would be allowed which eliminates one 
barrier for DR but at the same time, symmetry will be required 
which increases the barriers, although this could be party 
compensated by the new aggregation possibility. 
Table II aFRR characteristics 
 Demand barriers Shared barriers between demand and harmonisation Harmonisation barriers
Country Load access Aggregation 
Symmetry 
required 
Reaction 
time (s) 
Ramp 
rate 
FAT 
(min) 
Min. bid 
size 
(MW)
Increment 
(MW) 
Tender 
frequency 
Capacity 
procurement 
Capacity 
payment 
Activation 
rules 
BE N N N 30 13.3%per min 7.5 1 0.1 Monthly 
Co-optimising 
with FCR Pay-as-bid Pro-rata 
NL Y N N 30 7% per min 15 4 1 Annual 
Lowest 
average total 
price 
Pay-as-bid Merit order 
DE Y Y N 30 None 5 5 1 Weekly Together with energy Pay-as-bid 
Merit 
order 
FR Y Y Y Few minutes / 6-9 1 / / Mandatory 
Regulated 
price Pro-rata 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The research in this paper discussed how DR barriers are 
currently present in the reserve markets and how 
harmonisation impacts this. For FCR products, previous 
harmonisation led the way to products that are open for DR. 
However, for aFRR, this picture is not that clear. As 
harmonisation can still go both ways for this reserve, it is 
important to take into account the barriers for demand 
response when deciding on the characteristics of a harmonised 
market. Important differences are the symmetry requirements 
and the minimum bid size as these represent characteristics 
that are difficult for DR to comply with. However, as 
aggregation can alleviate these problems, this is the most 
important characteristic to consider.  
Taking into account the recommendations of this paper, 
harmonisation can be directed into a more DR-friendly 
approach. This will improve flexibility of our power system 
and thus provide a foundation for the further increase of 
renewable energy sources. 
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